We study a general model of stochastic evolution in games, assuming that players have inexact information about the game's payoffs or the population state. We show that when the population is large, its behavior over finite time spans follows an almost deterministic trajectory. While this result provides a useful description of disequilibrium behavior adjustment, it tells us little about equilibrium play.
Introduction
The study of evolution in games rests on three basic principles. First, players are myopic, basing decisions about how to play the game on the current population state. Second, aggregate behavior exhibits inertia: the population state changes gradually over time. Third, population sizes are large, rendering individual players anonymous. These three assumptions hold in most contexts in which evolutionary models are applied. They are also mutually reinforcing: for example, behaving myopically is most sensible when opponents' behavior adjusts slowly and when one is sufficiently anonymous that possible repeated game effects can be ignored.
A fourth principle which seems natural to add to this list is that of inexact information. In most settings in which evolutionary models are appropriate, it is reasonable to expect players' knowledge about either the game or their opponents' behavior to be somewhat hazy. Indeed, imprecise knowledge seems most consistent with the other assumptions of the evolutionary model. If the population size is large, exact information about the population state may be difficult to obtain; if players make costly efforts to gather such information, it seems incongruous to then assume that they act upon it in a shortsighted fashion.
In this paper, we study a general model of stochastic evolution in games with large, finite populations, examining the evolution of behavior over finite time spans.
Our main modeling restriction requires that players have inexact information about their strategic environment. We begin by showing that the population's behavior can approximated by a deterministic trajectory. While this result gives a precise description of disequilibrium behavior adjustment, it provides little information about equilibrium play.
This observation motivates the central results of the paper, which characterize equilibrium behavior under inexact information. We first prove that equilibrium behavior can be described by a diffusion. We then define new notion of evolutionary stability called local probabilistic stability (LPS), which requires that a large population which begins play in equilibrium settle into a fixed stochastic pattern around the equilibrium. We use the diffusion approximation to prove a simple characterization of local probabilistic stability. Local probabilistic stability of interior equilibria is closely related to stability under the deterministic dynamics.
However, stability of boundary equilibria is less demanding, and can be characterized in terms of robustness of the deterministic dynamics to perturbations which do not leave the boundary.
Models of evolution in games can be split into two classes according to how the populations of players are described. Most research has focused on models with continuous populations of players. In such models, evolution is described directly in terms of a population-level law of motion; studying evolution means characterizing solutions to certain differential equations. Analysis of these models is relatively simple. However, the continuous populations are intended as approximations of finite populations, and the restrictions on aggregate behavior stand in for an explicit specification of individual behavior. It is therefore natural to ask how behavior in the continuous population models is related to behavior in the discrete population models for which they serve as a proxy.
Discrete population models are built up from descriptions of how individual agents behave. While such primitives are obviously desirable, proceeding from them carries a cost: discrete models of evolution can be considerably more difficult to analyze than their continuous population counterparts. Consequently, much of the work on these models has been restricted to very simple cases, most often the single population, two strategy case.
We consider evolution in large but finite populations and give approximate characterizations of behavior in terms of continuous state systems -ordinary differential equations and diffusions. We can therefore both specify our model i n terms of individual behavior and characterize evolution in terms of relatively simple continuous state processes. In addition, our results suggest ways of interpreting the continuous population models used throughout the evolutionary literature.
In our model, a finite population of players repeatedly plays a game. Players occasionally receive opportunities to revise their behavior. A player who receives an opportunity decides how to act using a decision procedure, which for each population state specifies probabilities of switching between strategy pairs. W e illustrate through examples that the decision procedure can embody optimizing, imitative, experimental, or other sorts of choice criteria.
The only restriction we place on the decision procedures is that they reflect an absence of exact information. Formally, we require that the probabilities with which the decision procedure offers its various recommendations change continuously i n the population state. When players optimize, continuity can reflect uncertainty about opponent's behavior, or noise in the underlying payoffs. When players imitate, it can also reflect randomness in the choice of whom to mimic. Regardless of its source, the continuity of the decision procedures captures the idea that small changes in aggregate behavior should not lead to large changes in players' responses.
A population size, a decision procedure and an initial population state define a Markov behavior process. While this evolutionary process is stochastic, we are able to show that when the population size is large, behavior adjusts in a nearly deterministic fashion. We associate with each decision procedure a deterministic law of motion, which is a vector field derived from the expected motion of the behavior processes. We establish that over any finite time span, the behavior of a large enough population is closely approximated by a solution to the differential equation defined by the deterministic law of motion.
Why should this be so? When the population size is large, any individual change in behavior has a small effect on the population state. Many revision opportunities pass without the transition probabilities changing significantly.
Intuition based on the law of large numbers therefore suggests that the actual course of evolution should be largely determined by its expected direction of motion. Our result confirms the accuracy of the deterministic description of behavior over finite time spans. This deterministic approximation provides a clear description of behavior away from equilibrium, where by an equilibrium we mean a rest point of the deterministic law of motion.
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Unfortunately, this result does not enable us to determine which equilibria we should expect to persist. Away from rest points, the idiosyncratic noise from individual players' choices is inconsequential compared to the population's expected motion, which therefore governs its behavior. But at rest points, expected motion is zero; near rest points it is close to zero. Since solutions to differential equations are continuous in their initial conditions, it follows that if we fix the time span of interest in advance, a population that begins play close enough to any rest point will not stray far from the rest point during the span. Thus, the deterministic approximation tells us little about equilibrium behavior.
That expected motion is almost absent near rest points does not imply that a population near a rest point is in complete stasis. Rest points of the deterministic dynamics are points at which the expected flows of players between strategy are balanced. Since information is inexact, the actual flows between strategies are stochastic, and occur at strictly positive levels. Because the deterministic approximation eliminates all but the expected changes in the use of each strategy, it 1 The connections between these rest points and the Nash equilibria of the underlying game depends on the players' decision rule. For examples, see Sections 2 and 3.4. renders these latter properties invisible. To understand equilibrium behavior, we must keep this behavioral flux in full view.
We accomplish this by defining the local behavior process, which magnifies deviations from the equilibrium by the square root of the population size. By viewing the population on this magnified scale, we are able to perform a limit analysis which leaves the random variations in the population's behavior intact:
we prove that over any finite time span, the local behavior process of a large population is closely approximated by a diffusion.
While of interest in its own right, the diffusion approximation also provides the basis for our analysis of equilibrium stability. Since inexact information generally prevents the population's behavior from ever completely settling down, the right definition of stability must account for random variation of behavior around the equilibrium point. We call an equilibrium locally probabilistically stable (LPS) if a large population which begins play at the equilibrium settles into a fixed probability distribution around the equilibrium.
We use the diffusion approximation to establish a simple characterization of local probabilistic stability. We find that for generic interior equilibria, local probabilistic stability is equivalent to local stability under the deterministic dynamics.
2 Were we directly concerned with deterministic stability, we would test for it by examining the linearization of the dynamics around the equilibrium point;
an equilibrium is stable if this linearized system is a contraction. To prove our characterization, we show that the drift coefficient of our diffusion is given by this same linearized system. When the equilibrium is in the interior of the state space, this observation is enough to connect the two forms of stability.
The ties between probabilistic and deterministic stability become looser when we consider equilibria on the boundary of the state space. 3 In these cases, we find that local probabilistic stability can be characterized in terms of the robustness of the deterministic dynamics to perturbations which remain on the boundary. That mutants playing an unused strategy would disrupt the deterministic system has n o bearing on whether the equilibrium is locally probabilistically stable: a population playing such an equilibrium can still stay in a fixed distribution around the equilibrium for a long period of time.
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Of course, while the characterizations of these two notions of stability are nearly identical, t h e meanings of stability are quite different.
Why don't movements into the interior of the state space matter? Consider an equilibrium at which strategy i is not used. When the population is at the equilibrium, the expected change in the number of players choosing strategy i is by definition zero. Since no one is using strategy i at the equilibrium, the number playing i cannot fall. The equilibrium condition then implies that it also cannot rise. These statements remain approximately correct in a neighborhood of the equilibrium. We can therefore show that the presence of strategy i always remains negligible. Consequently, even if the appearance of enough players choosing strategy i would cause the population to pull away from the equilibrium, random variations in behavior do not introduce enough players choosing strategy i to enable the population to leave.
To our knowledge, this paper is the first to characterize equilibrium behavior i n an evolutionary model using a diffusion. However, a number of authors have proved special cases of our deterministic approximation result. Boylan (1995) shows how evolutionary processes based on random matching schemes converge to deterministic trajectories when the population size grows large. Binmore, Samuelson, and Vaughan (1995) , Börgers and Sarin (1997) , and Schlag (1998) consider particular models of evolution which converge to the replicator dynamics. Binmore and Samuelson (1999) prove a deterministic approximation result for discrete time models of evolution under a somewhat restrictive timing assumption.
We apply an approximation result due to Kurtz (1970) to prove convergence to a deterministic trajectory in a quite general model of evolution in games, and establish that inexact information is a sufficient condition for a deterministic approximation to be valid. Foster and Young (1990) , Fudenberg and Harris (1992) , and Cabrales (1998) model evolution in continuous populations using stochastic differential equations and characterize infinite horizon behavior. These authors assume directly that evolution is described by a diffusion rather than deriving this property from a more basic model. In addition, while in our model diffusions are only used to study behavior near equilibria, these authors use diffusions as a global description of behavior.
This difference arises because unlike us, these authors study evolution in the presence of aggregate shocks. For example, in Fudenberg and Harris (1992) , payoffs contain a noise term which follows a Brownian motion. Hence, the influence of randomness on payoffs is correlated over time, generating aggregate disturbances i n the evolutionary process. In contrast, we assume that conditional on the population state, payoffs and other random elements of the decision procedures are realized independently over time. Since in our model the noise influencing the evolutionary process is idiosyncratic, it vanishes when we consider how the proportions of players choosing each strategy evolve over time. We leave the study of finite population models with aggregate payoff noise for future research.
Section 2 introduces our results through three examples. Section 3 contains our formal model. Section 4 establishes the deterministic approximation, and Section 5 the diffusion approximation. Section 6 defines local probabilistic stability and characterizes stability of interior equilibria. Section 7 considers boundary equilibria.
Concluding discussion, including further comments on related literature, is offered in Section 8. Proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
Examples
In our three examples, populations of N players are repeatedly randomly matched to play a game. Occasionally, players receive opportunities to change their behavior; each player's revision opportunities arrive via independent, rate 1
Poisson processes.
In the first example, two populations of players are repeatedly matched to play the game of matching pennies in Figure 1 . In this example, we assume that when a player receives a revision opportunity, he learns the current strategy of a single opponent and plays a best response to that strategy. Let r represent the proportion of players in the column population who are playing strategy R, and let u represent the proportion of players in the row population playing strategy U.
We describe the players' decision procedure by the function d, where d(s, s') is the probability that a player who receives a revision opportunity and is currently playing strategy s will switch to strategy s'. A column player currently choosing strategy R will switch to strategy L if the opponent he queries plays strategy U; hence,
Given the payoff matrix in Figure 1 and the verbal description of the decision procedure, it is easy to see that the function d is given by
-7- Since the probability that a column player is given the next revision opportunity is 1 2 , and since each player makes up fraction 1 N of his population, the expected change in the proportion of players choosing strategy R during a single revision opportunity is
Similarly, the expected change in the proportion of players choosing strategy U is
Because each player's Poisson process is independent, revision opportunities in the society as a whole arrive at rate 2N. Thus, the expected increment per time unit is given by
We call f the deterministic law of motion associated with decision procedure d.
In Theorem 4.1, we establish that for sufficiently large population sizes, the evolution of behavior over any finite time span is described by the deterministic law of motion. In this example, behavior over finite time spans is arbitrarily well approximated by solutions to the differential equation
where x = (r, u). Some solutions to this equation are graphed in Figure 3 . All solutions converge to the dynamic equilibrium x* = ( 1 2 , 1 2 ), which is also the unique Nash equilibrium of this game. Hence, regardless of its initial state, the behavior of a large population will quickly come to approximate x*. 4 Next, we consider the evolution of play in the coordination game in Figure 2 .
This time, we assume that when a player receives a revision opportunity, he learns 4 It is worth noting that the decision procedure we have specified is not sensitive to the payoffs of the underlying game. Indeed, any payoffs with a counter-clockwise best response structure yield t h e same choice probabilities. Hence, behavior converges to x* = (1/2, 1/2) regardless of the Nash equilibrium of the underlying game. However, as we increase the size of the samples drawn by t h e players, the limit point of the dynamics approaches the Nash equilibrium of the underlying game. Further discussion of this decision procedure can be found in Section 3.4.1. For some surprising consequences of small sample sizes, see Sandholm (1999) . the behavior of three players in the opposing population and plays a best response to this sample. If sampling is performed without replacement, the decision procedure is described by
The law of motion associated with this decision procedure is therefore 2 )? Since x* is a rest point of both f and g, the solutions of both differential equations starting from x* are degenerate. Moreover, if we fix a time T, the continuity of solutions to differential equations in their initial conditions implies that a population which begins play close enough to x* will remain close to x* through time T.
Thus, while the deterministic approximation tells us a great deal about the finite horizon behavior of populations which begin play out of equilibrium, it tells us little about populations which begin play in equilibrium. The deterministic approximation relies on the fact that when the population size is large, idiosyncratic sampling noise is averaged away, leaving only the expected motion of the system.
Since rest points of the limiting system are points where expected motion is zero, the deterministic approximation suggests that very little happens at these points.
Of course, the rest point x* is not a point at which the population's behavior ceases to evolve; it is simply a point where the expected flows of players between strategies cancel one another out. 
The local behavior process magnifies the original behavior process by a factor of N , enabling us to perform a finer analysis of behavior near the equilibrium.
Rescaling by N is helpful because it allows us to obtain a limiting characterization of equilibrium play. In Theorem 5.1, we show that if the population size is large enough, the local behavior process is closely approximated by a diffusion. The drift coefficient of this diffusion is described in terms of the derivative of the law of motion at the equilibrium x*, which we denote Df(x*). In deterministic models, this derivative is used to characterize the behavior of trajectories starting near an equilibrium; in our stochastic model, we use this derivative to characterize equilibrium behavior itself.
In the matching pennies game, the local behavior process is approximated by the solution to
We call the solution to this stochastic differential equation the local limit process at x*. The eigenvalues of Df(x*), -1 ± i, both have negative real part, so the law of motion of Z t is a contraction perturbed by a white noise process. This process usually moves towards the origin, but the noise term prevents it from ever settling down. By solving the stochastic differential equation, we can explicitly describe the local limit process: it is a zero-mean Gaussian process whose covariance matrix at time T is In this section, B t represents a two-dimensional Brownian motion. 6 We use lowercase time subscripts to refer to entire processes and uppercase time subscripts to refer to a process at a particular moment in time. Thus, a population which begins play at the mixed equilibrium x* is immediately described by a normal distribution around x*; the covariance of this distribution converges exponentially quickly to 1 4 N I as time passes. When a large population which begins at an equilibrium is quickly described by some fixed distribution about the equilibrium, we call the equilibrium locally probabilistically stable (LPS).
Formally, a rest point is locally probabilistically stable if there is a zero-mean random variable Z ∞ such that
where the limits are in distribution. Taking the time limit last focuses attention o n behavior over finite time spans. 7 When this limit exists, a population which begins play at an equilibrium settles into a fixed distribution around the equilibrium; the standard deviations of the distribution describing X T N are of order
The analysis above shows that in the matching pennies game, x* is LPS. In contrast, the local behavior process of the coordination game is approximated by the solution to
starting from Z 0 ≡ 0. The eigenvalues of Dg(x*) are 1 2 and − 5 2 , so this stochastic differential equation has one expanding direction (along the 45˚ line) and one contracting direction (the orthogonal direction). The local limit process Z t is again a zero-mean Gaussian process, this time with time T covariance matrix 7 Taking the time limit first would lead one to consider infinite horizon behavior, as studied by Foster and Young (1990) , Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) and Young (1993) . In the first two examples, local probabilistic stability agreed with local stability under the deterministic dynamics. While this connection holds generically when we consider interior equilibria, at boundary equilibria the connection is broken: o n the boundary, deterministic stability is more demanding than local probabilistic stability.
Cov(Z T
To illustrate this, we consider a single population of players who are repeatedly randomly matched to play the symmetric game in Figure 5 . Strategy U is dominant; if this strategy is eliminated, a Hawk-Dove game remains. When a player receives a revision opportunity, he follows a simple imitative decision procedure: the player compares the payoff he received in his previous match to the payoff a randomly chosen opponent received in her previous match. If the opponent received a higher payoff, the player switches to her strategy; otherwise, he stays with his original strategy.
8 Let x = (u, m, d ) represent the population state. The decision procedure above is described by
Let π ( ) x = u + 2md represent the average payoffs in the population when the current state is x. Then the law of motion induced by this decision procedure is 8 This is a special case of the proportional imitation procedure (Schlag (1998) ) which we discuss in Section 3.4.2. 
This is the replicator dynamics for the game in 2 ). This process is approximated by the solution to
starting from Z 0 = 0. This local limit process is a zero-mean Gaussian process whose covariance matrix at time T is
The strategy U component of the local limit process is degenerate at zero, while the strategy M component converges in distribution to a normal distribution with mean zero and variance . Since x* is a rest point, the expected change in the number of players choosing any strategy is zero. Because no players are available to switch f r o m strategy U, it must also be that no players switch to strategy U. The variance of increments in the strategy U component at x* must therefore be zero, while the variance at nearby states must be very close to zero. Consequently, we see very little change in the use of strategy U. Since strategy U is never chosen by many players, that there are deterministic trajectories heading into the interior of the state space never becomes relevant.
The replicator dynamics always exhibit boundary equilibria; indeed pure strategies are always rest points under these dynamics. However, boundary equilibria can always be eliminated by introducing mutations. Suppose that players receiving a revision opportunity use the decision procedure above with probability (1 -ε) and chose a strategy at random with some probability ε > 0. The resulting deterministic law of motion admits no boundary equilibria, and so local probabilistic stability agrees with deterministic stability. However, boundary equilibria are not inconsistent with mutations. If mutation is intended to capture choice trembles, or to model experimentation or replacement which is quite infrequent, it is natural to assume that mutations occur with vanishingly small probability. We can model this explicitly by letting the mutation rate ε N decline as we consider larger and larger populations. If we do this, the limiting law of motion is once again the replicator dynamic h(·), with all boundary equilibria intact; so long as the mutation rate vanishes reasonably quickly (in particular, if ε N ∈ o( 1 N )), our equilibrium analysis remains valid.
The Model 3.1 The Underlying Game
We consider the evolution of behavior in games played by r ≥ 1 populations of players. For notational convenience, we assume that members of each population p can choose among n strategies. We let S p denote the strategy set for population p, and let S = We consider the evolution of behavior in large, finite populations. For notational convenience, we assume that each population has N members. If each player chooses a pure strategy, the set of possible strategy distributions is given by ∆ N = {x ∈ ∆: Nx i ∈ Z for all i ∈ S}. Each player's payoffs are represented by a random variable which depends on the player's strategy and the population state. We explicitly include payoff randomness to model settings in which players' decisions depend directly on payoff realizations.
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Formally, for each i ∈ S and x ∈ ∆ N , the random variable π i x ( ) represents the payoffs to a player choosing strategy i when the population state is x.
Payoffs are Markov, only depending on the past through the current state, and the payoffs received by different players during a single period are independent of one another. 11 Finally, π i x ( ) denotes expected payoffs.
For example, if players are randomly matched, it is desirable to let their decisions depend on t h e payoffs they actually receive in their matches rather than their expected payoffs ex ante.
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The latter assumption does not hold in all potential applications. For example, if we study players who are randomly matched, then for any finite population size, the payoffs received by different members of the same population are not quite independent, as conditioning on the matching of one -16-
Selection Mechanisms and Decision Procedures
Each evolutionary process can be characterized in terms of two components: a selection mechanism, which determines the times at which each player considers changing strategies, and a decision procedure, which specifies how players respond to such opportunities. We consider each in turn.
We find it convenient to model evolution in continuous time using Poisson selection. Under Poisson selection, all players' revision opportunities arrive via independent, rate 1 Poisson processes. Hence, a unit of time in our model is defined as the expected interval between a single player's revision opportunities. It follows that when there are r populations of size N, revision opportunities for the population as a whole follow a Poisson process with parameter rN, and that each opportunity is equally likely to go to any player.
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Decision procedures provide the link between the game's payoffs and the players' behavior. Suppose that the population state is x ∈ ∆ N and that a player currently choosing strategy i receives a revision opportunity. Then d N (i, j, x) is the probability that this player switches to strategy j. Clearly, for all populations p, all i ∈ S p , and all x ∈ ∆ N , the decision procedure
That is, a player can only choose strategies available to members of his population, and for each strategy and population state, the probabilities of all possible switches sum to one.
player slightly alters the match probabilities of the others. Moreover, if there is only a single population and players are not matched against themselves, the payoff distribution will depend on t h e population size in a vanishing way. Fortunately, our model of evolution will permit transition probabilities which depend in a vanishing way on the population size, so explicitly including these finite population effects would not alter our results.
Versions of our results also hold in a discrete time version of our model. In this case, we assume t h a t a new period begins every (1/rN) time units. For our results to continue to hold, it is enough to assume that the number of players who receive revision opportunities during each period is constant. One can also assume that each period's revision opportunities are allocated via an i.i.d. process; in this case, we require that the probability p N that any particular player receives an opportunity is such that Np N converges as N approaches infinity. Finite population effects (due, for example, to sampling without replacement)
can cause the decision procedure to depend on the population size. Fortunately, our results are not sensitive to such dependencies so long as they vanish sufficiently quickly. Formally, we assume that there exists a limit decision procedure d:
That is, as the population size grows large, differences in the choice probabilities vanish uniformly over the set of strategy distributions. This assumption accommodates finite population effects. Moreover, this allowance for slight variations in the decision procedures implies that mutations which occur at a vanishing rate do not affect our analysis.
We find it reasonable to expect players' choice probabilities not to be unduly sensitive to the current population state. 
Deterministic Laws of Motion
We begin our analysis by deriving the transition probabilities of the behavior process X t N . At each revision opportunity, a single player considers switching strategies. He either switches from his current strategy i ∈ S p to some new strategy j ∈ S p or decides to stay with strategy i. Hence, if the current population state is x ∈ ∆ N and the population size is N, the only states to which transitions are possible are of
− , where ι i and ι j are basis vectors in R rn . Since all players are equally likely to be granted the revision opportunity, the probability of a transition from state
We define I N : ∆ N → R rn to be the expected increment in X t N during the next revision opportunity conditional on the current population state:
While this definition is quite compact, it will be more useful to express the expected increments directly in terms of the decision procedures d N . Consider the expected change in the number of players choosing strategy i ∈ S p . The probability that the player given the revision opportunity is playing strategy i is x r i ; the probability that the player given the revision opportunity switches to strategy i is
To determine the expected change in the number of players choosing strategy i, we subtract the former expression from the latter, and then multiply by 
Assumption (A1) implies that the f N converge uniformly to f, while assumption (A2) implies that f is Lipschitz continuous. The latter property implies that the differential equation
admits a unique solution from every initial condition x 0 ∈ ∆. We show in Section 4 that the stochastic behavior process X t N closely mirrors solutions to this deterministic dynamical system over finite time spans. Before stating this result, we offer two examples of decision procedures and their deterministic laws of motion.
Examples
For simplicity, our examples involve single population of players; both examples can be generalized to allow for multiple populations. Furthermore, we speak directly in terms of the limit decision procedures; the finite population decision procedures are the same up to a term which vanishes at rate O( 1 N ).
Sample Best Response
Suppose that when a player receives a revision opportunity, he samples the behavior of s members of the population. He then plays a best response to the distribution of players in his sample under the assumption that it is representative of the behavior of the population as a whole. We call this procedure, which was introduced in our first two examples in Section 2, the sample best response procedure.
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Let B: ∆ → ∆ denote the best response correspondence for the expected payoffs π , and let S x denote a multinomial random variable with parameters s and x. For simplicity, suppose that all possible realizations of the sample induce a unique best response. Then the choice probabilities for the sample best response decision procedure are given by
The law of motion associated with this procedure is therefore
Related procedures are considered by Young (1993) and Kaniovski and Young (1995) . In these models, instead of choosing a best response to an incomplete sample of current behavior, players play a best response to an incomplete recollection of the history of play.
Since the distribution of S x is polynomial in x, so too are d s (i, j, x) and f x s ( ).
In contrast, suppose that the player receiving the revision opportunity is perfectly informed about the current population state. We call the resulting decision procedure the best response decision procedure. It is defined by
is unique}. This yields the law of motion
on ∆ u . This last equation defines the well-known best response dynamics. Since the best response dynamics are discontinuous in the population state, they lie outside the scope of our analysis.
The law of large numbers implies that the sample best response dynamics converge to the best response dynamics as the sample size approaches infinity (although convergence is not uniform). Nevertheless, the two decision procedures lead to very different behavior near equilibria. Continuous dynamics move very slowly near rest points; for this reason our deterministic approximation will provide little information about behavior near equilibria. In contrast, the best response dynamics are discontinuous at equilibria: very small changes in behavior can lead to a sharp acceleration in the evolutionary process. Our assumption of inexact information will preclude this possibility.
Proportional Imitation
The sample best response procedure requires players to know the payoff structure of the game. Since in many settings it is unreasonable to expect players to have such knowledge, it is important to consider procedures which do not require it. Consider this procedure proposed by Schlag (1998), a special case of which was used in our last example in Section 2. A player who receives a revision opportunity compares his current payoff realization to that of a randomly selected opponent. If his payoff is higher than hers, he continues to play the same strategy; otherwise, he switches to her strategy with a probability proportional to the difference in their payoffs.
This procedure, called proportional imitation, is described by
where β > 0 is small enough that the choice probabilities are always between zero and one. The law of motion generated by proportional imitation is
This law of motion is simply the replicator dynamics defined in terms of the expected payoffs of the game. The constant β only determines the speed of the evolutionary process.
revision opportunity, the increment in X t N is stochastic. However, during any time interval of length δ, the number of revision opportunities we should expect to occur is δrN, which grows without bound as the population size becomes large. On the other hand, the maximum change in any component of the population state during a single revision opportunity is Binmore and Samuelson (1999) prove a deterministic approximation result in a discrete time framework. They assume that as larger population sizes N are considered, the number of periods which occur per time unit grows faster than order N 2 . This guarantees that the occurrence of more than one revision opportunity in a single period becomes extremely unlikely. The discrete time model we describe in footnote 12 does not satisfy this restriction; Kurtz's (1970) results show that it is not needed for a deterministic approximation result to hold. 16 For a formal statement and proof, see, e.g., Robinson (1995, Theorem 5.3 
.3).
Fix some finite time T. Corollary 1 tells us that if a large enough population begins play close enough to an equilibrium, it is quite unlikely to leave the vicinity of the equilibrium through time T.
17
Theorem 4.1 shows that idiosyncratic noise tends to be drowned out by expected motion when the population size is large. Since at rest points there is no expected motion, the noise which is insignificant elsewhere takes on central importance. To characterize equilibrium behavior, we require an analysis which captures this noise explicitly.
Diffusion Approximation
The deterministic approximation can be viewed as a law of large numbers for the behavior process. Unfortunately, Corollary 4.2 shows that this result provides little information about equilibrium behavior. To obtain this information, we might seek a central limit theorem for the behavior process: by magnifying the behavior process by N about the equilibrium, we might hope to obtain a limit result which captures the random variations in the population's behavior. We therefore define the local behavior process at x* by
Theorem 5.1 shows that when the population size is large, the local behavior process is nearly a diffusion.
In order to establish the diffusion approximation, we need a somewhat stronger assumption concerning the convergence of the decision procedures: rather than requiring uniform convergence, we need a rate of convergence faster than
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Of course, if an equilibrium of a differential equation is unstable, even solutions which start extremely close to the equilibrium will eventually leave the vicinity of the equilibrium. However, we are concerned with behavior over some fixed, finite horizon. Corollary 4.1 says that if we fix the time span of interest in advance, solutions from points very close to the equilibrium will stay nearby during the span.
Since most finite population effects vanish at rate O( 1 N ), this stronger assumption is not unduly restrictive.
We also need the limit decision procedure to be continuously differentiable in the population state.
To characterize the random aspects of the evolutionary process, we need a measure of the dispersion of its increments. For this reason, we define the incremental covariance of the behavior process, The reason for this designation will become clear below.
A normalization will make our results easier to state. So far, we have expressed each population's behavior as a point in R n , where n is the number of strategies available to the population's members. However, since the population state must stay in the simplex ∆ p , it is only free to move in n -1 dimensions. It is therefore convenient to change the coordinates we use to refer to population states. From this point forward, we view each set ∆ p as a subset of R n−1 rather than as a subset of R n .
We accomplish this by identifying each element (x 1 , … , x n-1 , x n ) in R n with its projection (x 1 , … , x n-1 ) in R n−1 . Similarly, we consider the state space ∆ = ∆ p p ∏ a subset of R k , where k = r(n -1). Fortunately, all of our earlier definitions can still be used after minor modifications which account for this change in coordinates. In particular, f: ∆ → R k and a: ∆ → R k k × are defined as before if we simply leave off all arguments and components corresponding to the nth strategy of each population.
Since we want to characterize behavior near equilibria, it will be useful to have a simple description of expected motion near equilibria. We therefore define the derivative of f, Df: ∆ → R k k × , which exists for all x ∈ ∆ by assumption (A4). 18 We let D* = Df(x*) denote the derivative of f at the equilibrium x*.
The derivative D* can be used to determine the stability of x* under the differential equation
Taking a Taylor series of f about x* reveals that
when x is close to x*. It can therefore be shown that solutions of (D) near x* are conjugate to solutions of the linear equation Before stating our result, we introduce a few additional definitions. First, let a* = a(x*) denote the diffusion coefficient at x*. Since a* is symmetric and positive semidefinite, 19 it has a "square root": we can find a σ* ∈ R k k × such that σ*(σ*)' = a*.
Next, let {B t } t≥0 denote a k-dimensional Brownian motion. Finally, our notion of
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To define the derivative at points x on the boundary of ∆, it is enough to consider how f changes as we move from x in directions which stay within ∆. 
We call the process Z t the local limit process at x*. To prove Theorem 5.1, we appeal to a convergence theorem due to Stroock and Varadhan (1979) . They consider sequences of Markov processes whose increments become vanishingly small. Roughly speaking, their result says that if the expected increments and incremental covariances of a sequence of Markov processes converge to some functions µ(·) and σ 2 (·), then the Markov processes themselves converge to the diffusion whose drift and diffusion coefficients are µ(·) and σ 2 (·).
Diffusions (i.e., solutions to stochastic differential equations) in
We use this observation to sketch the proof of Theorem 5.1; details can be found i n the Appendix.
For simplicity, we assume that all decision rules are identical:
We first consider covariances. The deterministic approximation tells us that as the population size grows large, all variance in the original behavior processes 
The mean value theorem implies that
for some λ ∈ [0, 1]. Were x* were not a rest point (i.e., were f(x*) ≠ 0), the expected increment of Z t N would explode, and the diffusion approximation would fail. But since f(x*) = 0, we find that
As N grows large, this expression converges to Df(x*)z = D*z, which is therefore the drift coefficient of the limit process. We conclude that over any finite time span, Z t N converges weakly to the solution of the stochastic differential equation (S). The solution to this equation is obtained by introducing the integrating factor e D t − * and applying Ito's formula.
Local Probabilistic Stability
Because players' information is inexact, the flows of players between strategies are random. Even at rest points, where expected motion is absent, there is still considerable stochastic variation in players' behavior. The proper notion of equilibrium stability must account for this variation explicitly.
Theorem 5.1 shows that by examining the local behavior process, we can obtain a limiting description of equilibrium behavior which is independent of the population size. It is therefore natural to state our definition of stability in terms of this process. We call the equilibrium x* locally probabilistically stable (LPS) if there is a zero-mean random variable Z ∞ such that lim lim
where the limits are limits in distribution in R k .
Roughly speaking, LPS requires that when N is large, the random variable Z T N has nearly the same distribution as Z ∞ . We can restate this requirement in terms of the original behavior process: when N is large, the mean and covariance of X T N = x*
If an equilibrium is LPS, a population which begins play at that equilibrium settles into a fixed distribution around that equilibrium. The standard deviations of this distribution's components of are of order 1 N : the larger the population, the closer it will stay to the point x*. That we take the time limit last means that we are considering finite horizon behavior. That we take the time limit at all may seem to suggest that Z ∞ only describes behavior after a long time has passed. Fortunately, we shall see that whenever an equilibrium is LPS, the limit random variable Z ∞ describes behavior almost immediately.
We also offer a definition of instability of equilibrium.
We say that the equilibrium x* is locally probabilistically unstable ( The diffusion approximation provides the basis for our characterization of local probabilistic stability. Since the local behavior process Z t N converges to the local limit process Z t , it follows that lim lim
Hence, stability can be characterized directly in terms of the local limit process. Since this process is a zero-mean Gaussian process, its limit behavior only depends on the limit behavior of its time T covariance matrix, Cov(Z T ). If this matrix converges, then the equilibrium is LPS; if some component of Cov(Z T ) explodes, the equilibrium is LPU.
Theorem 6.1 characterizes the local probabilistic stability of interior equilibria.
Theorem 6.1: Let x* be a rest point of (D), and suppose that a* has full rank. Then i f all eigenvalues of D* have strictly negative real part, x* is LPS; otherwise, it is LPU.
The condition that the diffusion coefficient a* has full rank is a requirement that random motions are possible in all directions from x*. As long as x* is in the interior of ∆, most decision procedures reflecting inexact information will generate such random variations. Of course, in any particular example it is easy to check the full rank condition directly. If a* does not have full rank, then the condition that all eigenvalues of D* be negative is sufficient but not necessary for x* to be locally probabilistically stable. Essentially, the necessary condition requires negative eigenvalues for all eigenvectors corresponding to directions in which the population is able to move. Theorem 6.1 provides a simple way of checking whether an interior equilibrium is LPS. Consider the equilibrium x* = ( 1 2 , 1 2 ) of our first two examples in Section 2. In each case, the diffusion coefficient is the full rank matrix a* = 1 2 I, so we can apply the theorem. In the matching pennies game, the eigenvalues of the derivative D* are -1 ± i, so x* is LPS. In the coordination game, the eigenvalues of D* are Hence, the norm of e D t * falls at an exponential rate, and the integral Σ ∞ exists.
Indeed, whenever x* is LPS, Cov(Z T ) converges to its limit at an exponential rate, so the distribution of Z ∞ is not only describes behavior after a long time has passed, but in fact describes behavior almost immediately. At first glance, cases in which the real part of some eigenvalue is zero may seem quite rare. But as Binmore and Samuelson (1999) note, this must be true of any rest point which lies in a non-trivial component of rest points; such components are common features of dynamics for extensive form games. zero tells us that the linear system (L) is not a good enough approximation to form the basis for stability analysis. This is the source of the indeterminacy. In contrast, when analyzing local probabilistic stability, eigenvalues with real part zero correspond to directions in which movements towards or away from the equilibrium are driven entirely by noise. For example, when D* = 0, the local limit process is a Brownian motion: Z t = σ*B t . Since Cov(σ*B T ) = a*T, the equilibrium must be locally probabilistically unstable.
Boundary Equilibria
We now turn our attention to boundary equilibria. Boundary equilibria are common features of most standard evolutionary dynamics. The results in this section show that if we explicitly formulate foundations for these dynamics, we come to regard more boundary equilibria as stable than we otherwise might.
Of course, boundary equilibria can be eliminated by slightly perturbing the players' decision procedures. For example, one might assume that players choose strategies at random with some fixed, positive probability; doing so eliminates all boundary equilibria, rendering our results on such equilibria moot. On the other hand, mutations are not incompatible with boundary equilibria, so long as we allow the probability with which they occur to fall as we consider larger populations.
Vanishing mutations do not alter the limiting deterministic dynamics; moreover, by assumption (A3), our analysis of behavior near boundary equilibria is unaffected by mutations which vanish at rate o(
The following lemma is basic to understanding boundary behavior. If x* is a rest point at which strategy i is not used, then when the population is at state x*, the expected increment in the number of players choosing strategy i must be zero. But the number choosing this strategy cannot fall, and so cannot rise either.
Hence, near x*, the probability of any change in the use of strategy i must be close to zero.
Lemma 7.1 implies that the diffusion coefficient of a boundary equilibrium cannot have full rank. Therefore, Theorem 6.1 cannot be applied to test for local probabilistic stability. The lemma also helps us establish an important property of the local limit process.
Proposition 7.2:
If x* is a rest point with x i * = 0, then its local limit process Z t satisfies
Suppose that a large population begins play near a rest point x* at which strategy i is unused. Lemma 7.1 tells us that the probability that a player switches to or from strategy i during the next revision opportunity is very small. Proposition 7.2 extends this observation over time: even after a long interval has passed, the probability that strategy i is adopted by a significant fraction of the population remains negligible.
If x* is a pure strategy, Proposition 7.2 implies that very little variation in the use of any strategy is observed. Consequently, x* must be locally probabilistically stable.
Corollary 7.3:
If x* is a pure strategy rest point, the local limit process is the n u l l process: Z T ≡ 0 for all T ≥ 0. Therefore, x* is LPS.
Even if the deterministic dynamics lead away from x*, these dynamics move very slowly at points very close to x*. Since there is little random variation in behavior, the population never wanders far enough from the equilibrium for the deterministic dynamics to draw the population away. Even when players' information is inexact, their behavior near pure strategy rest points is almost completely noise free.
More generally, Proposition 7.2 says that when a population begins play near a boundary equilibrium, strategies outside the support of the equilibrium are never adopted to any significant extent. This suggests that a complete characterization of local probabilistic stability may be possible if we ignore directions of motion corresponding to unused strategies: that is, directions heading away from the boundary.
To prepare for such a result, we recall our convention of only explicitly representing n -1 out of n strategies in each population, so that population states are elements of R k = R r n ( ) −1 rather than R rn . To this we add a new convention: that each strategy which we omit is in the support of the equilibrium. Let Ŝ ⊂ S be the set of strategies which are represented explicitly, and let U ⊂ Ŝ be the set of strategies which are unused at x*: U = {i ∈ Ŝ : x i * = 0}. Denote the cardinality of Ŝ -U by κ. By our convention, all unused strategies in S are represented explicitly in Ŝ , and hence in U.
We include the unused strategies at first so that we can be certain to ignore them in our analysis. We let r* ∈ R Theorem 7.4 provides a simple, general method for determining local probabilistic stability. We illustrate its application to boundary equilibria using the final example from Section 2. In this example, the derivative matrix D* for the equilibrium x* = (0, 2 , suggesting that x* might not be stable. However, since strategy U is unused, we remove the row and column of D* corresponding to this strategy, obtaining the reduced derivative R* = -1 2 . Since R* is negative, x* is LPS.
To establish the stability of an equilibrium x* under the deterministic dynamics (D), one needs to check that all trajectories which begin near the equilibrium remain near the equilibrium. But if the deterministic dynamics are derived from a stochastic evolutionary process, it is enough to consider the behavior of the deterministic dynamics on the part of the boundary on which the equilibrium lies.
While there is variation in the use of strategies whose equilibrium probabilities lie strictly between 0 and 1, variation in the use of other strategies is small enough that these strategies can be ignored when evaluating stability.
Discussion
We study stochastic evolution under inexact information, focusing especial attention on equilibrium play. We establish that finite horizon behavior away from equilibria can be described by a differential equation, and that finite horizon behavior near equilibria can be described by a diffusion. We define a new notion of evolutionary stability which explicitly accounts for the random variations i n behavior created by inexact information, and use the diffusion approximation to establish a simple characterization of stability. While at interior equilibria, local probabilistic stability accords closely with standard deterministic notions of stability, it is significantly less demanding at equilibria which lie on the boundary.
It is useful to contrast the model studied here with models of stochastic fictitious play (Fudenberg and Kreps (1993) , Kaniovski and Young (1995) , Benaïm and Hirsch (1996) ). These models consider small groups of players who repeatedly play a normal form game. Players choose best responses to their recollections of the history of play. Suppose that payoffs are noisy, or that players' recollections of the history of play are incomplete. Then in certain classes of games, both the time average of past play and the players' choice probabilities converge with probability one over the infinite horizon; limit values approximate Nash equilibria of the underlying game.
In stochastic fictitious play models, the state variable represents the time average of past play. Consequently, the increments in the state variable become vanishingly small as time passes, making infinite horizon convergence results possible. Since i n our model the state variable represents current behavior, increments are of fixed size. For this reason, the behavior process in our model need not converge over the infinite horizon. Instead, the possible limiting time averages of play can be described by stationary distributions, one for each recurrent class of the behavior process.
Most work on stochastic evolution in games has focused on infinite horizon behavior, with results stated in terms of stationary distributions. For example, Foster and Young (1990) , Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) , and Young (1993) study stochastically stable equilibria, which are equilibria which receive all weight in the stationary distribution as the rate of mutation vanishes. These models offer unique predictions of infinite horizon behavior, even in games which exhibit multiple strict equilibria.
In this paper, we have focused on finite horizon analysis. Because very long time spans are required before the infinite horizon analysis of a large population becomes relevant, 22 we feel that in most economic contexts, the finite horizon analysis is the more appropriate one. Nevertheless, there are settings in which behavior over quite lengthy spans is of inherent interest. The characterization of infinite horizon behavior in our model is a topic for future research.
Appendix
We begin by stating the convergence results of Kurtz (1970) and Stroock and Varadhan (1979) used to prove Theorems 4.1 and 5.1; along the way we prove 
∑
We first present a version of a result on the convergence of pure jump Markov processes to deterministic flows due to Kurtz (1970, Theorem 2.11) 22 See Binmore, Samuelson, and Vaughan (1995) and Sandholm and Pauzner (1998) . Condition (1.1) requires that the expected increments per time unit converge uniformly to some limit function. Condition (1.2) demands that the probability of jumps bigger than order 1 N vanishes as N approaches infinity. Under these conditions, the finite horizon behavior of the pure jump Markov processes can be arbitrarily well approximated by the solution to a differential equation.
Proof of Theorem 4.1:
We apply Theorem A.1 to the process X t N . In this case,
, so condition (1.1) follows from Assumption (A1). The Lipschitz continuity of b follows from Assumption (A2). Finally, condition (1.2) follows immediately from the fact that at most one player changes strategies during each revision opportunity. s
We now present a result on the convergence of Markov processes to diffusions due to Stroock and Varadhan (1979) . Our presentation follows Durrett (1996) . In particular, the following result follows from Theorems 8.7.1, 5.2.2, 5.4.1, and 5.4.5
and Lemma 8.8.2 of Durrett (1996) . For all i and j we define for all T < ∞. Hence, the random variable Z T N converges in distribution to Z T for each T < ∞. To determine the stability of x* it is enough to consider whether Z T converges in distribution as T approaches infinity.
Since Z t is a mean zero Gaussian process, each random variable Z T is multivariate normal with mean zero. Thus, if the covariance matrix Cov(Z T ) converges as T approaches infinity, x* is stable; if some diagonal component of Cov(Z T ) heads to infinity, then x* is unstable. Equation (5.6.14)' of Karatzas and Shreve (1991) Recall that Ŝ is the set of the k strategies which are represented explicitly as coordinates in R k , which includes all strategies which are unused at x*.
The set of unused strategies is denoted U: that is, U = {i ∈ Ŝ : x i * = 0}. We proceed with three lemmas. Since r* is symmetric, positive semidefinite, and has full rank, it is positive definite. Let ρ* be a square root of r*: ρ*(ρ*)' = r*. Lemma 7.1 says that a* is U-null, and it reduces to r* by definition; we can therefore choose σ* to be the U-null matrix which reduces to ρ*. Therefore, since r* is symmetric and positive definite, the proof is completed by applying the proof of Theorem 6.1 to Σ T . s
